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Abstract
This paper uses possible-world semantics to model the changes that
may occur in an agent’s knowledge as she loses information. This builds on
previous work in which the agent may forget the truth-value of an atomic
proposition, to a more general case where she may forget the truth-value of
a propositional formula. The generalization poses some challenges, since
in order to forget whether a complex proposition pi is the case, the agent
must also lose information about the propositional atoms that appear in
it, and there is no unambiguous way to go about this.
We resolve this situation by considering expressions of the form [‡pi]ϕ,
which quantify over all possible (but ‘minimal’) ways of forgetting whether
pi. Propositional atoms are modified non-deterministically, although uni-
formly, in all possible worlds. We then represent this within action model
logic in order to give a sound and complete axiomatization for a logic with
knowledge and forgetting. Finally, some variants are discussed, such as
when an agent forgets pi (rather than forgets whether pi) and when the
modification of atomic facts is done non-uniformly throughout the model.
Keywords: forgetting, dynamic epistemic logic, action models, theory
contraction, knowledge representation.
1 Introduction
Epistemic notions such as knowledge and belief are subject to the effect of
different epistemic actions, many of which have been studied in the literature.
Just as beliefs can be affected by expansion [23], contraction [1, 10], revision
[23, 5, 16, 26, 24, 3], merging [15] and diverse forms of inference [33, 34] among
others, knowledge can be affected by deductive inference [31, 32], public [20, 11]
and other forms of announcements [2].
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One action that has not received much attention is that of forgetting and
its effect on an agent’s knowledge. One of the reasons for this is its similarities
with belief contraction, an action that, when represented semantically, typically
relies on Lewis’ system of spheres for conditionals [17]. This system of spheres
uses an ordering among theories (the theories’ ‘plausibility ordering’) and thus
provides a guideline for defining the new beliefs an agent will have when one
of the current ones is discarded [12]. This is adequate for belief contraction,
as a plausibility ordering is natural when defining beliefs: the collection of
epistemically possible situations can be understood as having an order which
not only defines this epistemic notion (as what is true in the most plausible
situations) but also establishes a ranking among what is not believed but still
has not been discarded. However, such an ordering is not natural when dealing
with knowledge: there does not seem to be an ordering among the epistemically
possible situations that are known to not be the case and hence have been
discarded.
On the other hand, in the knowledge representation area there are approaches
for forgetting a finite set of atoms. In such proposals knowledge is represented
as a finite set of formulas (the knowledge set), and the typical definition of
forgetting uses some notion of similarity between models: a knowledge set is the
result of forgetting the atoms in At ′ if and only if every model of the resulting
knowledge set is equivalent to a model of the original knowledge set when the
atoms in At ′ are disregarded [18]. In modal contexts as in this paper, the used
equivalence notion is that of bisimulation, which gives raise to systems [36, 37]
similar to those that contain modalities for bisimulation quantification [9].
This work presents a logical treatment under possible worlds semantics of an
action that represents the forgetting of propositional formulas, without relying
on an ordering among theories or epistemic possibilities and without using any
notion of similarity notion between models. It can be seen as an extension of [29],
which deals only with forgetting the truth-value of atomic propositions. Several
ways of forgetting a given formula are possible. We focus on two of them and give
some hints about variants with different properties. The key intuition guiding
our definitions is that an agent forgetting π will lose her (possible) previous
knowledge of π. But if she previously knew ¬π, there are two possibilities after
forgetting π: her knowledge of ¬π may fail or not. We call the first option
forgetting whether π and the second forgetting π. While we will focus more on
the first, we will also discuss the second possibility.
Layout of the paper Section 2 recalls some basic notions from propositional
and epistemic logic which will be used throughout the text. Section 3 presents
the notion of uniform forgetting whether which, being the main focus of the
article, is discussed in some detail in Section 4. Section 5 introduces a sim-
pler action of ‘forgetting’ (where a propositional formula is considered to be
possibly false, but not necessarily possibly true) and compares it to the action
of forgetting whether. Section 6 presents our main result, which is a sound
and complete axiomatization for our logic of knowledge and forgetting. Finally,
Section 7 discusses some alternate ways of modelling the action of forgetting.
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2 Basic definitions
Our formalism for reasoning about forgetting will be based on epistemic, or
more generally modal, logic. Throughout this text, At denotes a designated
countable non-empty set of atoms or propositional variables. Let us begin by
reviewing the basic language of propositional modal logic.
Definition 1. The grammar of L✷ is given by
ϕ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | ✷ϕ
where p ∈ At. Formulas of the form ✷ϕ are read as “the agent knows that ϕ is
the case”. The symbols ⊥, ∨, →, ↔ and ✸ are defined as usual.
Modal logics are typically interpreted via their Kripke or possible worlds
semantics, as described below:
Definition 2. A Kripke frame is a tuple F = 〈W,R〉 where W is a non-empty
set and R ⊆W×W a binary relation; no assumptions are made a priori about R.
A model M = 〈F , V 〉 is a frame F equipped with a valuation V : At → P (W ).
A pointed model is a pair (M, w) with M a model and w an element of its
domain.
Definition 3. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model. The satisfaction relation |=
between pointed models and formulas is defined as follows:
M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p);
M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|= ϕ;
M, w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ and M, w |= ψ;
M, w |= ✷ϕ iff for all v ∈ W , wRv implies M, v |= ϕ.
Given a model M, define the function J·K
M
: L✷ → P (W ) as w ∈ JϕK
M
if and
only if M, w |= ϕ. The notation JϕKM will be abbreviated as JϕK when this does
not lead to confusion.
As usual, M |= ϕ states that JϕK
M
= W , and if X is a class of models,
X |= ϕ states that M |= ϕ for all M ∈ X. The formula ϕ is valid when M |= ϕ
for every model M, a case denoted by |= ϕ.
When modelling knowledge, the class of models in which the relation is an
equivalence relation, S5, is of particular interest. However, this paper will keep a
more general discussion, only restricting its attention to models with particular
properties when explicitly stated.
In order to formalize our notion of forgetting, it will be convenient to rep-
resent propositional formulas in conjunctive normal form using sets of clauses.
Recall that a literal ℓ is an atom or its negation, and a clause D is a finite
(possibly empty) set of literals interpreted disjunctively, so that D represents
the formula
∨
D1. A clause D is said to be a consequence of a propositional
formula π when |= π →
∨
D.
A propositional formula is in conjunctive normal form when it is given as a
finite (possibly empty) set of clauses, interpreted conjunctively. More precisely,
the set of clauses C is interpreted as the formula Ĉ defined as
Ĉ :=
∧
D∈C
∨
D.
1As usual,
∨
∅ := ⊥ and
∧
∅ := ⊤.
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π C(π) π C(π)
p ∧ q {{p} , {q}} ¬(p ∧ q) {{¬p,¬q}}
p ∨ q {{p, q}} ¬(p ∨ q) {{¬p} , {¬q}}
p→ q {{¬p, q}} ¬(p→ q) {{p} , {¬q}}
p↔ q {{¬p, q} , {p,¬q}} ¬(p↔ q) {{p, q} , {¬p,¬q}}
Figure 1: Some clausal forms that will be used in the text.
Clearly, a given propositional formula may have many equivalent conjunctive
normal forms, but we wish to pick one canonically. In order to do so, first
discard all tautological clauses, i.e. those clauses D in which there is an atom
p such that {p,¬p} ⊆ D. A clause D 6= ∅ which is non-tautological is called
contingent. Then, within each clause, ‘unnecessary’ literals are removed: a
clause D is said to be a minimal consequence of a propositional formula π if and
only if |= π →
∨
D and there is no D′ ( D such that |= π →
∨
D′. With this
in mind, here is a formal definition:
Definition 4. Let π be a formula of propositional logic. Define the clausal form
C(π) to be the set of all clauses that are minimal non-tautological consequences
of π. Figure 1 shows some examples.
The normal form C(π) is actually the set of prime implicates of π (cf. [21,
22]), and there are several algorithms for calculating it (e.g., [21, 6, 14, 25, 22];
see [4] for more). This concept has been already used for epistemic concerns,
mainly on proposals following the AGM approach for belief revision [1] in which
the agent’s beliefs are represented syntactically (e.g., [19, 38]). Here it will be
used to simplify the model operation defined of the next section for representing
the action of forgetting π.
The next lemma is then straightforward.
Lemma 1. For any propositional formula π, the set C(π) is finite, its elements
are finite, and it satisfies |= π ↔ Ĉ(π). Moreover, π1 ≡ π2 implies C(π1) =
C(π2), and C(⊤) = ∅ while C(⊥) = {∅}.
3 Uniform forgetting
In order to reason about forgetting whether, the basic modal language will be
extended with a new modality.
Definition 5. The language L✷‡ extends L✷ with expressions of the form [‡π]ϕ
with π a propositional formula, read as “after the agent forgets whether π, ϕ is
the case”. The expression 〈‡π〉ϕ is defined in the standard way as ¬[‡π]¬ϕ.
It is worthwhile to emphasise that, as discussed before, this paper under-
stands “forgetting whether π” simply as “forgetting π’s truth-value”; as such,
the act of forgetting studied here does not involve other related actions (as, e.g.,
becoming unaware of atoms/formulas [27, 28]).
Observe how, since ✷ϕ is the case when ϕ holds in all of the agent’s epistemic
alternatives, in order for her to forget (i.e., to not know anymore) that a given
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propositional formula π is the case, she needs to consider as possible at least one
situation where π fails. The first step is, then, to decide how to make a given
π fail in a given world w. Suppose that π is not a tautology (such case will be
discussed later). When π is rewritten in its clausal form C(π) = {D1, . . . , Dn},
it is clear than in order to make π false at w, at least one clause in C(π) should
be false in such a world; this would, in principle, give us a total of 2n − 1
different forms of falsifying π. However, falsifying an arbitrary non-empty set of
such clauses would be problematic, both because of the combinatorial explosion
and because the negations of different clauses might be mutually inconsistent.
A better alternative is to follow a minimal change approach, where π will be
falsified by making only one of its clauses Di false.
Now, given the clause that will be falsified, we need to decide not only how
many worlds need to be introduced as part of the agent’s epistemic possibilities,
but also which truth-value will be assigned, in such new worlds, to the atoms
that do not appear in the given clause. Again, the minimal change approach
suggests that the least intrusive way to change the agent’s knowledge is to make
a copy of the current epistemic possibilities and then falsify the given clause
in each one of them.2 In the resulting model, the original formula π has been
uniformly falsified because the same clause Di ∈ C(π) has been falsified across
all the worlds in the new copy of the set of epistemic possibilities.
The formalisation of this idea will be used to provide the semantic inter-
pretation of formulas expressing the effect of the slightly different ‘forgetting
whether π’, [‡π]ϕ. In order for an agent to forget the truth-value of a given
π, she needs to consider not only a possibility that falsifies π (by falsifying one
of the clauses of π’s clausal form) but also a possibility that falsifies ¬π (by
falsifying one of the clauses of ¬π’s clausal form). Thus, a model operation rep-
resenting this action takes two clauses and creates two copies of the current set
of epistemic possibilities, with each copy falsifying one clause. The operation
defined below is a generalisation that receives an epistemic model and a finite
set of clauses C, returning a model with a copy of the current set of epistemic
possibilities falsifying each clause in C.
Definition 6. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model and C = {Di : i ∈ I} a finite
(possibly empty) set of non-tautological clauses, where without loss of generality
0 6∈ I. The new model MCu = 〈W
C
u , R
C
u, V
C
u 〉 is defined as follows:
1. W Cu :=W × ({0} ∪ I);
2. for all w, v ∈W and i, j ∈ {0} ∪ I, (w, i)RCu(v, j) if and only if wRv;
3. for all w ∈W , (w, 0) ∈ V Cu (p) if and only if w ∈ V (p); and
4. for all w ∈W and i ∈ I, (w, i) ∈ V Cu (p) if and only if one of the following
holds:
(a) ¬p ∈ Di; or
(b) both {p,¬p} ∩Di = ∅ and w ∈ V (p).
2Of course, such operation is not minimal with respect to the number of worlds that will
be added; it is minimal with respect to the changes in the agent’s knowledge.
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Thus, W Cu has two types of worlds. Worlds of the form (w, 0) preserve the
original valuation: an atom p is true on (w, 0) if and only if p was already true
on w. On the other hand, each world of the form (w, i) with i ∈ I falsifies all
of the literals in Di, leaving the remaining atoms as before. The relation in the
new model simply follows the original relation, making a world (v, j) accessible
from a world (w, i) when v is accessible from w in the original model.
Note also that we are modelling forgetting within the context of epistemic
logic, where knowledge is represented semantically. This leads to several key dif-
ferences from syntactic approaches of knowledge representation. Most notably,
an agent cannot distinguish between semantically equivalent formulas (so, if she
knows π, she also knows all its semantic equivalents). By using both π’s and ¬π’s
minimal clausal forms, the forgetting whether action treats semantically equiva-
lent formulas in the same way (so, afterwards, the agent has forgotten not only
π’s truth value, but also that of all π’s semantic equivalents). Approaches that
distinguish semantically equivalent formulas are possible, but would require a
different framework for modelling the agent’s knowledge.
With this model operation it is possible to define the semantic interpretation
of formulas of the form [‡π]ϕ which, it is recalled, are intuitively read as “after
the agent forgets the truth-value of π, ϕ is the case”.
Definition 7. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model and w a world of W . We extend
Definition 3 to L✷‡ by defining M, w |= [‡π]ϕ if and only if, for all D1 ∈ C(π)
and D2 ∈ C(¬π),
M{D1,D2}u , (w, 0) |= ϕ.
The set of formulas in L✷‡ valid under |= will be denoted Log✷‡.
Thus, [‡π]ϕ states that ϕ is the case after the agent forgets the truth value
of π, independently of the choice of the clauses D1 ∈ C(π) and D2 ∈ C(¬π) that
are falsified in the added worlds.
4 The effect of forgetting whether
The model MCu is the result of the agent considering new possibilities in which
each clause in C fails. This is achieved by keeping a copy of the original model
(the (w, 0)-worlds, which preserve the original valuation) and adding, for each
clause Di, a copy of the original model (the (w, i)-worlds) in which Di is falsified
by falsifying each of its literals in all of the worlds in the copy, keeping the
remaining atoms as before. Thus, each clause Di is false at each world (w, i),
as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 2. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model and C = {Di : i ∈ I} a non-empty
finite set of non-tautological clauses (again 0 /∈ I). Then, for any w ∈ W and
any i ∈ I,
MCu, (w, i) 6|=
∨
Di.
Proof. If Di = ∅ the result is trivial, as
∨
Di = ⊥. Otherwise take Di =
{l1, . . . , lm} (i.e., Di is contingent). Then, for any lk ∈ Di,
• if lk is an atom p, then since Di is contingent, ¬p 6∈ Di; thus, by definition,
(w, i) 6∈ V Cu (p) and hence (w, i) 6∈ JlkK
MCu .
6
• if lk is an atom’s negation ¬p, then ¬p ∈ Di; so, by definition, (w, i) ∈
V Cu (p) and thus (w, i) 6∈ JlkK
MCu .
Hence, every literal inDi fails at (w, i) and therefore so the disjunction
∨
Di.
Example 1. Consider the following pointed model (M, w0) (with each world w
containing V (w) and the evaluation double-circled) in which the agent knows p
(i.e., M, w0 |= ✷p):
p p
w0 w1
Consider the action of forgetting whether p. Given that C(p) = {{p}}, there
is only one clause to be chosen: {p}. Similarly, C(¬p) = {{¬p}}, so the only
clauses the agent will consider when forgetting whether p are D1 = {p} and
D2 = {¬p}. The pointed model (M
{{p},{¬p}}
u , (w0, 0)) appears below, with the
top row being the copy that results from making {p} false and the bottom row
being the copy that results from making {¬p} false (thus making p true in those
worlds):
p p
p p
(w0, 1) (w1, 1)
(w0, 0) (w1, 0)
(w0, 2) (w1, 2)
As a result of the action, the agent considers possible worlds where p holds as
well as worlds where p fails. Thus, M
{{p},{¬p}}
u , (w0, 0) |= ¬✷p ∧ ¬✷¬p, and
hence M, w0 |= ✷p ∧ [‡p](¬✷p ∧ ¬✷¬p).
In the previous example, note how, if w1 were the evaluation point at the
initial model (and hence (w1, 0) the evaluation point at the model after the
operation), then the agent would know p before the action (by vacuity), but
she would still know p afterwards (by vacuity too). The following proposition
shows that this counterintuitive outcome of the forgetting whether action can
only occur when the knowledge of the agent is inconsistent to begin with.
Proposition 1. Let π be a propositional formula that is neither a tautology
nor a contradiction (so C(π) and C(¬π) are both non-empty sets of contingent
clauses). Then,
|= [‡π](✷¬π ∨✷π)↔ ✷⊥.
Proof. Let (M, w) be a pointed model with M = 〈W,R, V 〉.
From right to left, suppose M, w |= ✷⊥. Then there is no v such that
wRv and hence by RCu’s definition, and regardless of C, there is no (v, i) such
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that (w, 0)RCu(v, i). Hence M
C
u, (w, 0) |= ✷¬π ∨ ✷π and therefore M, w |=
[‡π](✷¬π ∨ ✷π).
The left-to-right direction is proved by contrapositive. Suppose thatM, w |=
¬✷⊥; then there is v such that wRv. By Definition 6, for any D1 ∈ C(π)
and D2 ∈ C(¬π), (w, 0)R
{D1,D2}
u (v, 1) and (w, 0)R
{D1,D2}
u (v, 2). By the con-
tingency of D1 and D2 and Lemma 2, M
{D1,D2}
u , (v, i) 6|=
∨
Di for i ∈ {1, 2}
and hence both M
{D1,D2}
u , (v, 1) 6|= Ĉ(π) and M
{D1,D2}
u , (v, 2) 6|= Ĉ(¬π). Then
M
{D1,D2}
u , (w, 0) |= ✸¬π ∧ ✸π and therefore, since neither C(π) nor C(¬π) is
empty, M, w |= 〈‡π〉(✸π ∧✸¬π), i.e., M, w 6|= [‡π](✷π ∨ ✷¬π).
As a special case, if π is an atom p, both C(p) = {{p}} and C(¬p) = {{¬p}}
are non-empty and both contain only contingent clauses, so from the above
proposition it follows that [‡p](✷p ∨ ✷¬p) ↔ ✷⊥ is valid. More interestingly,
recall that an agent’s knowledge is consistent atw if and only if w has at least one
accessible world. In the class of models where this consistency property holds,
called serial and denoted by Ser, we obtain a stronger version of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1. For any non-tautological and non-contradictory propositional for-
mula π,
Ser |= 〈‡π〉⊤ ∧ [‡π](¬✷π ∧ ¬✷¬π).
Note that Proposition 1 is restricted to formulas π that are neither tautolo-
gies nor contradictions because otherwise the proof does not go through: in
such cases either C(π) = ∅ or else C(¬π) = ∅, and hence there are no clauses
for falsifying one of π or ¬π. As a consequence of this behaviour, both [‡⊤]ϕ
and [‡⊥]ϕ are valid for any formula ϕ, and thus neither 〈‡⊤〉⊤ nor 〈‡⊥〉⊤ is
satisfiable.
Example 2. Consider the following pointed model in which the agent knows
p→ q.
pq q
w0 w1
Consider the act of forgetting whether p → q. Since C(p → q) = {{¬p, q}} and
C(¬(p→ q)) = {{p} {¬q}}, there are two possible outcomes:
By using {¬p, q} and {p}: By using {¬p, q} and {¬q}:
p p
pq q
q q
(w0, 1) (w1, 1)
(w0, 0) (w1, 0)
(w0, 2) (w1, 2)
p p
pq q
pq q
(w0, 1) (w1, 1)
(w0, 0) (w1, 0)
(w0, 2) (w1, 2)
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Observe how ¬✷(p→ q) holds in the two pointed models, as in both the agent
considers possible a world where p holds but q fails. Similarly, ¬✷¬(p→ q)
holds in the two cases, as in both models the agent considers possible worlds
where p→ q holds.
Still, the two pointed models do not represent the same state of knowledge
or, to be precise, they are not bisimilar. In the model on the left, the agent
considers possible a world where ¬p ∧ q holds and p ∧ q is possible (the path
(w0, 0) → (w0, 2) → (w0, 0)), a possibility that does not exists in the model
on the right (any transition from (w0, 0) to a ¬p ∧ q-world forces a move to
the right-hand side of the diagram, from which there are no arrows back to the
left-side). Thus,
M{{¬p,q},{p}}u , (w0, 0) |= ✸(¬p ∧ q ∧✸(p ∧ q))
but
M{{¬p,q},{¬q}}u , (w0, 0) 6|= ✸(¬p ∧ q ∧✸(p ∧ q))
and hence
M, w0 6|= [‡(p→ q)]✸(¬p ∧ q ∧✸(p ∧ q)).
Example 3. Consider again the initial pointed model of Example 2. Observe
how the agent knows neither p ∧ q (she considers w1 possible) nor ¬(p ∧ q)
(she considers w0 possible). Since C(p ∧ q) = {{p} , {q}} and C(¬(p ∧ q)) =
{{¬p,¬q}}, there are two possible outcomes for an action of forgetting the truth-
value of the already ‘unknown’ p ∧ q:
By using {p} and {¬p,¬q}: By using {q} and {¬p,¬q}:
q q
pq q
pq pq
(w0, 1) (w1, 1)
(w0, 0) (w1, 0)
(w0, 2) (w1, 2)
p
pq q
pq pq
(w0, 1) (w1, 1)
(w0, 0) (w1, 0)
(w0, 2) (w1, 2)
In both resulting pointed models the agent still knows neither p∧q nor ¬(p∧q).
However, in both cases the action has an effect on the agent’s information: in
the leftmost pointed model she considers possible a ¬p ∧ q-world, (w0, 1), from
which there is an accessible p∧ q-world, (w0, 0), something she did not consider
possible before:
M
{{p},{¬p,¬q}}
u , (w0, 0) |= ✸(¬p ∧ q ∧ ✸(p ∧ q)) but M, w0 6|= ✸(¬p ∧ q ∧✸(p ∧ q)).
Moreover, in the rightmost pointed model she considers possible a p∧¬q-world,
(w0, 1), something she did not consider possible before:
M
{{q},{¬p,¬q}}
u , (w0, 0) |= ✸(p ∧ ¬q) yet M, w0 6|= ✸(p ∧ ¬q).
Thus, forgetting the truth-value of formulas whose truth-value is not known to
begin with can affect the agent’s information by giving her ‘new reasons’ to not
know the formula’s truth-value.
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5 A simpler ‘forgetting’ action
In the current setting it is straightforward to define a simpler action that, instead
of forgetting π’s truth value, simply forgets that π is the case. For this, it is
enough to use the model operation of Definition 6 omitting the clause for C(¬π).
Here are the formal definitions:
Definition 8. The language L✷† extends L✷ with operators of the form [†π]
for π a propositional formula, thus allowing the construction of formulas of the
form [†π]ϕ, read as “after the agent forgets π, ϕ is the case”.
Definition 9. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model, w ∈W and π be a propositional
formula. We extend Definition 3 by setting
M, w |= [†π]ϕ iff ∀D ∈ C(π),M{D}u , (w, 0) |= ϕ.
This shows how the forgetting whether π action of before consists of simul-
taneously forgetting both π and ¬π. The question naturally arises of whether
the action of forgetting π’s truth-value could instead be defined as forgetting π
and then forgetting ¬π. Below it is shown that this is not the case.
Proposition 2. The expressions [‡π]ϕ and [†π][†¬π]ϕ are not equivalent, even
over the class of S5 models.
Proof. Consider the following pointed model (M, w0) with both p and q false
at w0:
w0
Now, let π be ¬p∨¬q. So, C(π) = {{¬p,¬q}} and C(¬π) = {{p} , {q}}. Then, by
using first {¬p,¬q} in C(π) and then {q} in C(¬π), we build (M
{{¬p,¬q}}
u )
{{q}}
u
in the following way:
pq
(w0, 0) (w0, 1)
pq
p
((w0, 0), 0) ((w0, 1), 0)
((w0, 0), 1) ((w0, 1), 1)
M
{{¬p,¬q}}
u
(
M
{{¬p,¬q}}
u
){{q}}
u
Observe that in the resulting model the agent can access the state ((w0, 1), 1)
where p ∧ ¬q is true, so
M, w0 |= 〈†π〉〈†¬π〉✸(p ∧ ¬q)
But with forgetting whether π, starting at M it is not possible to produce a
state where p ∧ ¬q is true. With independence of the chosen clause in C(¬π),
we arrive at the following model:
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pq
(w0, 0)(w0, 1) (w0, 2)
Then, M, w0 6|= 〈‡π〉✸(p ∧ ¬q).
Another difference between forgetting and forgetting whether is that, while it
is not possible to forget the truth-value of a contradiction, it is possible to forget
a contradiction, as C(⊥) 6= ∅. In fact, |= [†⊥]ϕ ↔ ϕ and |= [†⊥]ϕ ↔ 〈†⊥〉ϕ.
Note, however, that if the agent knows a contradiction, the action of forgetting
(the contradiction itself or any other formula) will not ‘fix’ this. In fact, the
action cannot turn an agent’s knowledge contradictory or consistent if it was
not that way before.
Proposition 3. Let π be any propositional formula that is neither a tautology
nor a contradiction. Then,
|= ✷⊥ ↔ [†π]✷⊥.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, take any pointed model (M, w). The
antecedent ✷⊥ states that w has no successors and hence, by Definition 6,
neither does (w, 0) regardless of the chosen clause D ∈ C(π); thus, [†π]✷⊥.
For the other direction, argue by contrapositive. Assume thatM, w |= ¬✷⊥.
Then, w has at least one successor and hence, by Definition 6, so does (w, 0)
regardless of the chosen clause D ∈ C(π); thus, [†π]¬✷⊥.
With respect to tautologies, forgetting behaves as forgetting whether: the
clausal form of ⊤ is ∅, and therefore it is not possible to forget a tautology.
When compared with the action of forgetting whether, the action of forget-
ting is closer to the well-known action of belief contraction: both represent an
epistemic action after which the agent does not know/believe a given formula,
regardless of the epistemic attitude towards the formula’s negation. This allows
a more accurate comparison with a key concept within belief contraction: that
of recovery.
An action of forgetting a given π might have side-effects: the agent might
also forget a second formula ϕ. In such cases it seems desirable for an action of
‘remembering’ π to make the agent to remember ϕ too.3 The forgetting action of
this section satisfies a form of recovery, restricted to cases in which π was known
to begin with. For describing this we will use the public announcement operation
in public announcement logic [20, 11], represented syntactically with formulas
of the form !π, as it matches closely the semantic nature of this approach.
Proposition 4. If π is a propositional formula and ϕ an arbitrary formula of
L✷ then
(✷π ∧ ϕ)→ [†π][!π]ϕ
is valid over the class of transitive models.
3Still, within AGM, the recovery postulate is the most discussed, as there are examples
showing that such behaviour is not always reasonable. See, e.g., [13, 7, 8].
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Proof. We will assume familiarity with the semantics of !π and give only a sketch
of the argument. Suppose that M is a transitive model and w is a world of M
such that M, w |= ✷π ∧ ϕ. If D ∈ C(π) is arbitrary, then M
{D}
u is obtained
from M by adding a copy of each world where D fails, but after applying !π,
we pass to the model (M
{D}
u )!pi where all such worlds are deleted. Since every
world accessible from w (and hence, by transitivity, in the submodel generated
by w) already satisfied π, the submodel generated by w in M is isomorphic to
the submodel generated by (w, 0) in (M
{D}
u )!pi. Hence (M
{D}
u )!pi , (w, 0) |= ϕ. It
follows that M
{D}
u , (w, 0) |= [!π]ϕ and, since D was arbitrary, that M, (w, 0) |=
[†π][!π]ϕ. Since M and w were also arbitrary, the claim follows.
6 An axiomatization
The operation of Definition 6, with a finite (possibly empty) set of non-tauto-
logical clauses C as a parameter, produces a new model that contains |C| + 1
copies of the original one, with one copy being identical to the original and with
the rest being the result of falsifying uniformly each one of the clauses in C.
This and other similar effects can be achieved by so-called action models.
Definition 10 (Action model). Let L be a formal language that can be inter-
preted over the models of Definition 2. An L-action model is defined as a tuple
U = 〈E,R,Pre,Post〉, where E is a non-empty set of actions, R ⊆ E × E is a
binary relation, Pre : E → L a precondition function assigning a formula of
L to each action in E, and Post : (E × At) → L a postcondition function as-
signing a formula of L to each pair of atom in At and action in E. A pointed
action model is a pair (U, e) where U is an action model and e an element of its
domain.
Action models are intended to be applied to relational models; such appli-
cation produces a new relational model, defined as follows.
Definition 11 (Product update). Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model and U =
〈E,R,Pre,Post〉 an action model. The new model M⊗U = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 is given
by:
• W ′ := {(w, e) ∈ (W × E) | M, w |= Pre(e)};
• (w, e)R′(u, f) iff wRu and eRf; and
• for every p ∈ At, V ′(p) := {(w, e) ∈ W ′ | M, w |= Post(e, p)} .
In words, the new model’s domain is the restricted Cartesian product be-
tween M’s and U’s: (w, e) is a world in M⊗ U if and only if w satisfies e’s
precondition. In this new model, the agent cannot distinguish world (u, f) from
world (w, e) if and only if she did not distinguish u from w in M and could not
distinguish f from e in U. Finally, a world (w, e) satisfies an atom p if and only
if w satisfied p’s postcondition at e in M.
Action models will be useful to us since the model operation of Definition 6
can be represented by the specific action model described below.
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Definition 12. Let C = {Di : i ∈ I} be a finite (possibly empty) set of non-
tautological clauses. The action model UC = 〈E,R,Pre,Post〉 is given by
E := {ei}i∈{0}∪I , R := E× E, Pre(ei) := ⊤ for all i ∈ {0} ∪ I,
for every p ∈ At, Post(e0, p) := p and, for i ∈ I,
Post(ei, p) :=

p if {p,¬p} ∩Di = ∅;
⊤ if ¬p ∈ Di;
⊥ if p ∈ Di.
Example 4. Consider π = p∧q, and recall that C(π) = {{p} , {q}} and C(¬π) =
{{¬p,¬q}}. Then, the action model U{{p},{¬p,¬q}}, defined using one clause in
C(π) and one in C(¬π), is given by:
⊤
⊤ ⊤
e0
e{p} e{¬p,¬q}
Post(e0, λ) = λ
Post(e{p}, p) = ⊥
Post(e{p}, λ) = λ
λ /∈ {p}
Post(e{¬p,¬q}, p) = ⊤
Post(e{¬p,¬q}, q) = ⊤
Post(e{¬p,¬q}, λ) = λ
λ /∈ {p, q}
Preconditions are represented inside the states. For states other than e0, the
postconditions are set up to falsify each state’s respective clause.
Note how, in every action model UC , the relation E is the full Cartesian
product. Thus, the upgrade operation of Definition 11 preserves many relational
properties, including seriality, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity and euclidean-
ity. These action models give us an alternative representation of the models
MCu:
Proposition 5. Let M be a model and C a finite (possibly empty) set of non-
tautological clauses. Then, the models MCu from Definition 6 and M⊗UC from
Definitions 12 and 11 are isomorphic.
Proof. Take a modelM = 〈W,R, V 〉; it will be proved thatMCu = 〈W
C
u , R
C
u, V
C
u 〉
and M⊗ UC = 〈W
′, R′, V ′〉 are isomorphic, witness the function f : W Cu → W
′
given by f(w, i) = (w, ei).
First, note how (w, i)RCu(v, j) iff (w, ei)R
′(v, ej). This is because, by Defini-
tion 6, (w, i)RCu(v, j) iff wRv. Moreover, by Definition 11, (w, ei)R
′(v, ej) iff wRv
and eiRej . But, by Definition 12, R is the total relation in E, so (w, i)R
C
u(v, j)
iff (w, ei)R
′(v, ej).
Now, to prove that (w, i) ∈ V Cu (p) iff f(w, i) ∈ V
′(p), observe that, by
Definition 6, (w, 0) ∈ V Cu (p) iff w ∈ V (p). By Definition 11, (w, e0) ∈ V
′(p) iff
M, w |= Post(e0, p), and by Definition 12, Post(e0, p) = p, so (w, e0) ∈ V
′(p)
iff M, w |= p iff w ∈ V (p) iff (w, 0) ∈ V Cu (p). For i 6= 0, by Definition 6,
(w, i) ∈ V Cu (p) iff
either {p,¬p} ∩Di = ∅ and w ∈ V (p), or else ¬p ∈ Di. (1)
By Definition 11,
(w, ei) ∈ V
′(p) iff M, w |= Post(ei, p); (2)
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but by Definition 12, (M, w) may only satisfy Post(ei, p) in two cases, when it
is p and ⊤, as ⊥ is unsatisfiable. Then, recalling (2), (w, ei) ∈ V
′(p) iff
M, w |= p and {p,¬p} ∩Di = ∅, or else M, w |= ⊤ and ¬p ∈ Di.
(3)
Note the equivalence of (1) and (3), which proves that (w, i) ∈ V Cu (p) iff (w, ei) ∈
V ′(p).
This correspondence of our model operation with the effect of UC allows
the use of the action models machinery for obtaining an axiom system for the
language L✷‡ with respect to our semantic models. First, recall the definition
of the satisfaction relation for action model logic.
Definition 13. Let A be a set of finite pointed L✷-action models, that is, a set
containing pointed L✷-action models (thus with precondition and postconditions
functions returning formulas in L✷) whose domain is finite (non-empty) and in
which each action affects the truth-value of at most a finite number of atomic
propositions.4 The language L✷A extends L✷ with new formulas of the form
[U, e]ϕ with (U, e) ∈ A. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 and w ∈ W . The satisfaction
relation of Definition 3 is extended by setting M, w |= [U, e]ϕ if and only if
M, w |= Pre(e) ⇒ M ⊗ U, (w, e) |= ϕ.
The set of valid formulas of L✷A is denoted by Log✷A.
The following result is based on the action model axiomatization provided
in Section 6.6 of [30] together with the remarks of [35] (the latter in the con-
text of public announcements). Recall that the logic K contains propositional
tautologies, modus ponens, the distribution axiom ⊢ ✷(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✷ψ)
and the necessitation rule that derives ⊢ ✷ϕ from ⊢ ϕ.
Theorem 1. Let Λ be any of the logics K, T , K4, K5, S4, S5 and let A
be a set of Λ-complying finite pointed L✷-action models. The logic Log✷A is
axiomatized by the modal logic Λ together with the following axioms and rules
for all (U, e) ∈ A:
⊢ [U, e]p ↔ (Pre(e)→ Post(e, p)) ⊢ [U, e]✷ϕ ↔
(
Pre(e)→
∧
f∈R[e]✷[U, f]ϕ
)
⊢ [U, e]¬ϕ ↔ (Pre(e)→ ¬[U, e]ϕ) ⊢ [U, e](ϕ→ ψ) → ([U, e]ϕ→ [U, e]ψ)
⊢ [U, e](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([U, e]ϕ ∧ [U, e]ψ) From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ [U, e]ϕ
This result can be used to obtain an axiom system for our particular modal-
ity [‡π]. Given clauses D1 ∈ C(π) and D2 ∈ C(¬π), our axiom system will
use the auxiliary modalities [D1, D2], [D1, D2] and [D1, D2], whose semantic
interpretation is as follows:
M, w |= [D1, D2]ϕ iff M
{D1,D2}, (w, 0) |= ϕ;
M, w |= [D1, D2]ϕ iff M
{D1,D2}, (w, 1) |= ϕ; and
M, w |= [D1, D2]ϕ iff M
{D1,D2}, (w, 2) |= ϕ.
4This finiteness condition is required to allow each pointed action model [U, e] to be as-
sociated to a syntactic object and thus to be used as a modality within formulas. For more
details, the reader is referred to Section 6.1 of [30].
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Observe how [D1, D2], [D1, D2] and [D1, D2] correspond, respectively, to
[U{D1,D2}, e0], [U{D1,D2}, e1] and [U{D1,D2}, e2], with UC the L✷-action model of
Definition 12. Moreover, note how the use of UC within a modality is proper,
as it is a finite action model: it has a non-empty finite domain and, given that
both D1 and D2 are finite (Lemma 1), each one of its actions changes the truth-
value of at most a finite number of atomic propositions. Finally, note how [‡π]ϕ
is equivalent to
∧
D1∈C(pi)
∧
D2∈C(¬pi)
[D1, D2]ϕ. Our axiomatization is, then, as
follows:
Definition 14 (The axiom system Ax✷‡D). Let D be the set of all pointed
action models of the form (U{D1,D2}, ei) with i ∈ {0, 1, 2} (recall that Pre(e0) =
Pre(e1) = Pre(e2)) and Dj a finite non-tautological clause; let L✷‡D be the
extension of L✷‡ with expressions of the form [U, e]ϕ with (U, e) ∈ D.
The set of axioms Ax✷‡D is defined by the following schemas:
⊢ [‡pi]ϕ ↔
∧
D1∈C(pi)
∧
D2∈C(¬pi)
[D1, D2]ϕ
⊢ [D1, D2]p ↔ p for all p ∈ At
⊢ [D1, D2]p ↔ p if {p,¬p} ∩D1 = ∅
⊢ [D1, D2]p ↔ ⊤ if ¬p ∈ D1
⊢ [D1, D2]p ↔ ⊥ if p ∈ D1
⊢ [D1, D2]p ↔ p if {p,¬p} ∩D2 = ∅
⊢ [D1, D2]p ↔ ⊤ if ¬p ∈ D2
⊢ [D1, D2]p ↔ ⊥ if p ∈ D2
⊢ [ ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[ ]ϕ
⊢ [ ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ ([ ]ϕ ∧ [ ]ψ)
⊢ [ ]✷ϕ ↔ ✷
(
[D1, D2]ϕ ∧ [D1, D2]ϕ ∧ [D1, D2]ϕ
)
⊢ [ ](ϕ→ ψ) → ([ ]ϕ→ [ ]ψ)
From ⊢ ϕ infer ⊢ [ ]ϕ
where [ ] is any of [D1, D2], [D1, D2] and [D1, D2] and π is propositional.
It is now possible to state this paper’s main result:
Theorem 2. Let Λ be any of the logics K, T , K4, K5, S4, S5. A formula ϕ ∈
L✷‡D is valid over the class of Λ-complying models if and only if Λ+Ax✷‡D ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Soundness is immediate since all axioms are true and all rules preserve
validity, where we appeal to Theorem 1 for those axioms involving action models.
For completeness, let ϕ ∈ L✷‡D be a valid formula. Then, by the first axiom
of Ax✷‡D, the formula ϕ can be replaced by a provably equivalent formula
ϕ̂ ∈ L✷D. By Theorem 1, ϕ̂ is derivable, hence so is ϕ.
Since the action models in D were auxiliary, it might be useful to restate this
result in terms of our original language:
Corollary 2. Let Λ be any of the logics K, T , K4, K5, S4, S5. A formula
ϕ ∈ L✷‡ is valid over the class of Λ-complying models if and only if it is derivable
in Λ +Ax✷‡D.
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7 Alternative forgetting operators
There are many possibilities when modelling the action of forgetting. Our aim
has been to present a semantic approach, rather than a syntactic one, but even
then there are several routes one can take. In this section we mention some
variations and discuss how they relate to our proposal.
7.1 Conditionally forgetting
The defined actions of forgetting π (Definition 9) and forgetting whether π (Def-
inition 7) do not have any precondition, and thus they can take place regardless
of whether the agent knows π (for forgetting π) or knows either π or else ¬π (for
forgetting whether π). This choice has been made because, technically, there
is no reason to restrict the respective operations: they can be applied to any
model, regardless of the agent’s epistemic attitude towards π.5 As a result, even
though anomalies may occur in ‘abnormal’ situations, the defined actions work
as expected in the intended cases (the agent knows / knows whether the –non
tautological and non contradictory– formula she is forgetting is the case).
However, it is also interesting to assume that the agent would not act unless
she is in an intended situation. Let us focus on the action of forgetting π. An
interesting possibility is working as in Definition 9 when the agent knows π but
doing nothing otherwise.
Definition 15. For a propositional formula π, define a modal operator [†′π]
and extend the semantics in Definition 3 by setting
M, w |= [†′π]ϕ iff
{
∀D ∈ C(π),M
{D}
u , (w, 0) |= ϕ if M, w |= ✷π
M, w |= ϕ otherwise.
Thus, ϕ should be always evaluated, and the precondition only determines where:
in M
{D}
u for every D ∈ C(π) when the precondition holds, and only in M
otherwise.6
This new operator has several properties that are interesting when compared
to other approaches as belief contraction. For example, a vacuity principle is
immediate:
Proposition 6. If π is propositional and ϕ is an arbitrary formula then
1. ¬✷π → (ϕ↔ [†′π]ϕ) is valid, but
2. ¬✷π → (ϕ↔ [†π]ϕ) is not necessarily valid.
5Compare this with the precondition for public announcements. In order to be announced,
a formula needs to be true, not only because of the interpretation of the operation (public
and truthful announcements), but also for technical reasons: if the formula is false, then the
evaluation point will be removed, and thus it is not possible to evaluate formulas in it after
the operation.
6Note how this is different from other alternatives, as the one used in public announcement
logic when evaluating [!pi]ϕ: if the announced formula pi is not true, then ϕ does not need to
be evaluated, and [!pi]ϕ holds by vacuity.
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Proof. The first claim is immediate from Definition 15.
As a counterexample for the second claim we may take π = p∧q and ϕ = ✷p,
then consider a model with a single reflexive world w satisfying p ∧ ¬q. Then,
M, w |= ✷p, but M
{{p}}
u , (w, 0) |= ¬✷p, and hence
M, w |= ¬✷π ∧ ¬(ϕ↔ [†π]ϕ).
Thus the two notions of forgetting behave differently. However, in order to
study them together, it is not necessarily to have both as primitives: the version
with precondition can be defined in terms of its more general counterpart.
Proposition 7. If π is propositional and ϕ is arbitrary, then
|= [†′π]ϕ↔ (¬✷π ∧ ϕ) ∨ (✷π ∧ [†π]ϕ).
A similar variant could be defined of [‡π]. We will not go into details, but
the treatment here would be more nuanced, as we would have to consider three
cases, depending on whether ✷π, ✷¬π, or neither one of them holds.
7.2 Strongly forgetting whether
As another natural alternative, a deterministic version of our operator can be
explored which would entail that the agent loses all information regarding π.
According to Definition 7, in order to check [‡π]ϕ, we need to check ϕ in several
models, one for each element in C(π)×C(¬π). The number of models to check can
be exponential. An alternative deterministic forgetting operator could create
just one model by appending a new copy of each world for each clause in C(π)∪
C(¬π).
Definition 16. For a propositional formula π, define a modal operator [‡∗π]
and extend the semantics in Definition 3 by setting
M, w |= [‡∗π]ϕ iff MC(pi)∪C(¬pi)u |= ϕ. (4)
So now we need only check one model, but the price to pay is that the new
model may be exponentially larger than the original. As before, the alternative
operator [‡∗π]ϕ would have different properties to [‡π]ϕ. For example, we have
the following:
Proposition 8. Over the class of serial models,
1. [‡∗(p ∧ q)] (¬✷p ∧ ¬✷q) is valid, but
2. [‡(p ∧ q)] (¬✷p ∧ ¬✷q) is not valid.
Proof. Suppose that M is a serial model, w is a world of M and v a world
accessible from w. The clausal form of p∧q is {{p} , {q}}, while the clausal form
of ¬(p ∧ q) is {{¬p,¬q}}. Thus C(p ∧ q) ∪ C(¬(p ∧ q)) = {{p} , {q} , {¬p,¬q}}
and in M
C(p∧q)∪C(¬(p∧q))
u from (w, 0) is accessible a world (v, {p}) satisfying ¬p
and another (v, {q}) satisfying ¬q. It follows that
M, w |= [‡∗(p ∧ q)](¬✷p ∧ ¬✷q).
Since M and w were arbitrary, the first claim follows.
For the second, consider a model consisting of a single reflexive point w
satisfying p ∧ q. Then, (M
{{q},{¬p,¬q}}
u , w) clearly satisfies ✷p, so M, w 6|=
[‡(p ∧ q)] (¬✷p ∧ ¬✷q), and hence this formula is not valid.
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7.3 Dependent forgetting
In uniform forgetting (Definition 7), an agent forgets a formula π by falsifying
a fixed clause of π’s clausal form in one copy of the initial model and a fixed
clause of ¬π’s clausal form in another. However, it may be that at every point
in the model, she forgets π ‘for a different reason’. This gives an alternative way
to model forgetting, which behaves in a different way from uniform forgetting
as presented above. Let us give the definitions.
Definition 17. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model and (C1, C2) be two sets of
clauses. A forgetting function pair is a pair of functions (f1, f2) such that
f1 : W → C1 and f2 : W → C2.
The model M
(f1,f2)
d = 〈W
(f1,f2)
d , R
(f1,f2)
d , V
(f1,f2)
d 〉 is given by
W
(f1,f2)
d = W × {0, 1, 2} , (w, i)R
(f1,f2)
d (v, j) iff wRv
and, for each p ∈ At:
1. (w, 0) ∈ V
(f1,f2)
d (p) iff w ∈ V (p); and
2. for i = 1, 2, (w, i) ∈ V
(f1,f2)
d (p) iff either {p,¬p} ∩ fi(w) = ∅ and w ∈
V (p), or else ¬p ∈ fi(w).
Thus, the model M
(f1,f2)
d contains three copies of M. The elements of the
first, the (w, 0) worlds, have the original atomic valuation; each element of the
second, the (w, 1) worlds, falsifies a particular clause in C1, as indicated by the
forgetting function f1; finally, each element of the third copy, the (w, 2) worlds,
falsifies a particular clause in C2, as indicated by the forgetting function f2.
Definition 18. Let M be a model. Define the dependent satisfaction relation
|=d on M by extending Definition 3 with M, w |=d [‡π]ϕ if and only if
∀f1 : W → C(π), ∀f2 : W → C(¬π),M
(f1,f2)
d , (w, 0) |=d ϕ.
The set of formulas in L✷‡ valid under |=d will be denoted d-Log✷‡.
It turns out that our dependent and uniform interpretations give rise to
different logics.
Proposition 9. The logics Log
✷‡ (for uniform forgetting) and d-Log✷‡ (for
dependent forgetting) are different. In particular, if
ϕ = ✷(p ∧ q)→ [‡(p ∧ q)](✷p ∨ ✷q),
then ϕ ∈ Log
✷‡ \ d-Log✷‡; this is true even if we restrict to the class of S5
models.
Proof. We argue semantically that ϕ ∈ Log
✷‡. Let M = 〈W,R, V 〉 be a model
and w ∈W satisfy ✷(p∧q). We have that C(p∧q) = {{p} , {q}} and C(¬(p∧q)) =
{{¬p,¬q}}, so to check that [‡(p ∧ q)](✷p ∨ ✷q) holds in w it is enough to see
that (M
{{p},{¬p,¬q}}
u , (w, 0)) and (M
{{q},{¬p,¬q}}
u , (w, 0)) both satisfy ✷p ∨ ✷q.
Let M
{{p},{¬p,¬q}}
u = 〈W ′, R′, V ′〉 and suppose that (w, 0)R′(v, i); we claim
that independently of i, (v, i) ∈ V ′(q). If i = 0, this follows from the assumption
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that w ∈ Jp ∧ qKM. If i = 1, then q does not occur in {p} and then (v, 1) ∈ V ′(q).
Finally, if i = 2, then ¬q ∈ {¬p,¬q} so (v, 2) ∈ V ′(q). In all three cases,
(v, i) ∈ V ′(q) and since (v, i) was arbitrary, (w, 0) ∈ J✷qK
M{{p},{¬p,¬q}}u .
A symmetric argument shows that M
{{q},{¬p,¬q}}
u , (w, 0) |=d ✷p, so that
M, w |= [‡(p ∧ q)](✷p ∨ ✷q), as claimed.
It remains to check that ϕ 6∈ d-Log
✷‡. For this, consider the model M =
〈W,R, V 〉 shown below, where W = {w, v}, R is the full relation on W and
V (p) = V (q) = W ; observe that M is an S5 model.
pq pq
w v
Clearly, M, w |=d ✷(p ∧ q). To show that M, w 6|=d [‡(p ∧ q)](✷p ∨ ✷q), we
only need to exhibit two forgetting functions f1 : W → {{p} , {q}} and f2 : W →
{{¬p,¬q}} such thatM(f1,f2), w 6|=d ✷p∨✷q. Let f1(w) = {p} and f1(v) = {q},
while f2(w) = f2(v) = {¬p,¬q}. The resulting model M
(f1,f2) = 〈W ′′, R′′, V ′′〉
is the following.
q p
pq pq
pq pq
(w, 1) (v, 1)
(w, 0) (v, 0)
(w, 2) (v, 2)
Observe how R′′ is also the full relation. Moreover, (w, 1) 6∈ V ′′(p) and (v, 1) 6∈
V ′′(q), so (w, 0) 6∈ J✷p ∨ ✷qK
M(f1,f2)
and hence M, w 6|=d [‡(p ∧ q)](✷p ∨ ✷q),
as desired.
Thus, the notion of dependent forgetting leads to a different logic of uniform
forgetting. Our example above suggests that, with depending forgetting, more
information is lost in the act of forgetting, and this may be desirable in appli-
cations. However, the technique of representing forgetting in terms of action
models does not work in this setting (at least not in a straightforward way); a
further exploration of this notion of forgetting is left for future work.
8 Conclusions
The present paper uses the possible world semantics to model the changes that
occur in an agent’s information when she forgets the truth-value of a proposi-
tional formula as represented by its ‘minimal’ conjunctive normal form. Besides
introducing a uniform forgetting whether model operation representing such ac-
tion and its correspondent modality for expressing its effects, the paper has
discussed several properties of the operation as well as provided a sound and
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complete axiom system for it. Two variations of this uniform forgetting whether
action have been explored: a simpler uniform forgetting action which simply
forgets that a given formula is the case, and a more complex dependent forget-
ting whether under which the agent might forget the given formula’s truth-value
for different reasons in different parts of the model. It has been proved not only
that uniform forgetting whether cannot be defined in terms of the simpler uni-
form forgetting, but also that the uniform forgetting whether and the dependent
forgetting whether give raise to different logics.
Several directions are left for further study. First, the axiomatization of the
dependent forgetting logic is still an open issue. It is possible that the action
models axioms can be used for dependent forgetting if some restrictions are
introduced to the forgetting functions. Second, and possibly more interesting, is
an action of forgetting modal formulas, which would allow the agents to forget
their own or other agents’ epistemic states. Finally, our model of forgetting
differs in several ways from the belief contraction approach. We leave a more
comprehensive comparison of the two, along with a possible unification, for
future work.
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